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When one considers the results of social scientific surveys, secularisation in Germany seems 
to be a more or less linear process of erosion of what is traditionally named religiosity. The 
percentage of citizens who affirm that they are “religious”, believe in God or otherworldly 
beings, hope for life after death or participate regularly in the praxis of a religious community 
has been – by and large – steadily declining for decades. This decline has occurred over the 
succeeding generations: The younger the generation, the fewer “religious” people in it.
2  
 
But the process of secularisation is apparent not only in this persistent quantitative shrinkage 
from generation to generation. Above all it also manifests itself – this is my thesis – in the 
transformation of the habitus formations and contents of faith of the generations. The essence 
of  ongoing  secularisation  naturally  is  reflected  most  clearly  in  its  contemporary  state  of 
development which is represented in the youngest adult generation. Therefore the analysis of 
this generation is particularly interesting for the sociology of religion.  
 
But I will not confine this paper to this generation. After indicating some basic premises of 
the sociology of generations and the notion of secularisation I presuppose in this paper, I will 
try to outline hypothetically the succession of generations in Germany, from the so-called 
generation of ´68 to the youngest adult generation, concluding with some remarks about the 
progress  of  secularisation.  The  empirical  basis  of  my  argument  is  provided  by  case 
reconstructions of interviews and group discussions undertaken by a group of sociologists in 
Germany  I  belong  to  according  to  the  methodological  principles  of  Ulrich  Oevermann’s 
Objective  Hermeneutics.
3  Of  course  the  presentation  of  these  case  reconstructions  is  not 
possible  in  this  short  article.  Regrettably  such  a  presentation  does  not  exist  in  other 
publications at this moment, which is without a doubt a serious deficiency. Without a detailed 
derivation from case reconstructions, the following outline of the succession of generations 
remains without demanding empirical proof. Nevertheless, as hypothetical outline it turns our  
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attention to an aspect of the succession of generations, which has found little consideration 
thus far in sociological research.  
 
2. Premises concerning the sociology of generations 
Now, a few words about my assumptions in the sociology of generations. In this paper I use 
the  notion  “generation”  only  in  the  sense  of  a  distinguishable  age  cohort  which  shows  a 
specific ”character” and cultural orientation and not in the sense of the three generations in a 
family. Each generation has a specific habitus formation and specific contents of faith (or 
specific  “probation  myths”  to  use  Oevermann’s  terminology
4).  It  is  a  historical  type. 
According  to  Oevermann
5  and  drawing  upon  Mannheim
6,  I  suppose  that  a  generation  is 
shaped in reaction to the historical situation of a specific political community and that the 
adolescents of this community become a generation through the socialisation process that is 
framed  and  affected  by  historical  circumstances.  The  socialisation  process  I  regard  with 
Oevermann
7 as structured by a succession of “separation crises”: birth, the end of the primary, 
post-natal,  mother-child  symbiosis,  the  end  of  the  “Oedipus  complex”  and  finally 
adolescence.  The  historical  situation  has  a  bearing  on  the  formation  of  the  subjects  of  a 
specific  age  cohort  in  the  course  of  these  universal  separation  crises.  Certainly  the  most 
important separation crisis in the emergence of a generation is adolescence, when they have to 
develop a concept of life which establishes them as independent adults and gives meaning to 
their life as part of the life of their community and humankind. In order to shape their concept 
of life they have to open up to the politico-social situation of the time. This is subsequently 
engraven in their way of thinking and acting and determines both for the rest of their lives 
after they finally leave the social moratorium of adolescence and enter the “time of probation” 
(Oevermann)  in  which  they  have  to  trust  their  acquired  life  concept.  As  members  of  the 
occupied  adult  generations  they  can  revise  and  adjust  their  original  life  concepts  to  the 
transforming  societal  situation  only  to  a  limited  extent,  whereas  the  life  concepts  of 
adolescents  downright  “originate”  from  the  actual  societal  constellation.  So  much  for  the 
sociology of generations. 
 
3. The concept of secularisation 
Now, very briefly, some remarks on the concept of secularisation I assume in this paper. I 
regard the process of secularisation as an unavoidable and in a sense logical consequence of 
Weber’s universal-historic dynamics of rationalisation which thrives in the Judaeo-Christian  
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religious  tradition.  I  conceive  it  in  Weber’s  terms  as  a  process  whereby  the  life  conduct 
becomes ever more disenchanted, rationalised and methodical. That the contents of faith that 
guide one’s life conduct become ever more worldly is implicit in this approach! 
 
Furthermore, I tie in with Oevermann’s “structural model of religiosity”
8, which supplies a 
structuralist-pragmatist  explanation  for  the  dynamics  of  rationalisation  and  secularisation 
Weber  analysed  and  is  therefore  a  crucial  enhancement  to  Weber’s  approach.  With 
Oevermann’s structural model of religiosity, which I unfortunately cannot present in this short 
article, one can demonstrate that the secularisation process materially refers to the potential 
for autonomy
9 that distinguishes human life. The process of secularisation consists in the ever 
more  elaborate  articulation  of  this  autonomy  potential  in  the  myths  of  provenance  and 
probation that guide life conduct. Thus the secularisation process is to be understood not only 
formally, as the substitution of religious with secular contents of the life conduct, but also as a 
material process directed at the realisation of the autonomy potential.
10 In it the search for 
answers to the three universal mythical questions “Who am I? Where do I come from? Where 
am I going?” is given over to the Individual. Trusting in God and his earthly “representatives” 
who were considered as delivering these answers to the Individual is replaced by trusting 
oneself. However, this development only really becomes evident in the industrialised world in 
the  second  half  of  the  20
th  century,  when  the  life  conduct  of  the  Individual  becomes 
progressively detraditionalised, as – in the sixties – traditional bonds  were fundamentally 
questioned. Secularisation is thus a lengthy gradated historical process. Firstly there was the 
secularisation  of  intellectual  discourse  in  the  Enlightenment.  Then  came  the  practical 
secularisation for the basis of legitimate rule in the French Revolution. In this transition from 
the doctrine of divine right to the sovereignty of the people, the potential for autonomy was 
realised only in the most general sense. Its realisation in the details of the praxis of the nation 
state, including individual life conduct, has not yet been completed and probably never will 
be. And a further major step would and probably will be the introduction of a sufficient and 
unconditional  basic  income  for  every  citizen,  i.e.  irrespective  of  any  income  from  other 
sources and of age, without requiring the performance of any work or the willingness to 
accept a job if offered. A basic income once more would expand enormously the autonomy of 
the Individual. It would mean the valediction from the still collectively binding and therein 
religious work ethics and the enabling of a meaningful positive life without paid work. It 
would thereby resolve the persistent crisis of the “working society” and would lay a stable  
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foundation for the frequently discussed “knowledge society”. So much for the concept of 
secularisation. 
 
4. The succession of generations since the 1960s 
I will now try to outline very briefly the succession of generations in Germany over the last 
fifty  years.  In  so  doing  I  confine  myself  to  the  peculiarities  of  the  different  generations, 
particularly those relevant to secularisation, and exclude the different historical situations that 
constitute the background of those peculiarities. Naturally the boundaries of the age cohort of 
a generation are not sharp and their determination could only be rough. 
 
(1) I start the outline with the “generation of ‘68”, because in this generation traditional 
bonds were programmatically and principally questioned, which constitutes a fundamental 
break in regard to secularisation. Thereafter Individuals could no longer hold onto traditional 
bonds in an unbroken and taken-for-granted form. David Riesman has analysed the beginning 
of this transformation in the USA after the Second World War as a transition from the “inner-
directed” to the “other-directed character”.
11 The German generation of ‘68, which comprises 
those born between 1945 and 1952, is the first generation in which the older principle-guided 
“inner-directed character” has an outsider status and in which the “other-directed character” 
dominates. Henceforth other-direction was a general premise for the formation of generations. 
The departure in principle from traditional bonds posed the following problem for individual 
life conduct: the three universal mythical questions “Who am I? Where do I come from? 
Where am I going?” had to be answered autonomously and not through religious tradition. 
This required a great deal of self-confidence and “ego-capability” (“Ich-Leistung”, Freud) 
and demanded an understanding of the problems of the autonomous life conduct. But these 
requirements were lacking in the beginning and first had to be developed. It is my thesis that 
this process extends over the succession of generations from the generation of ‘68 to the 
youngest adult generation. I would like to sketch this now. 
 
One characteristic of the generation of ‘68 was the symbolic violation of rules. In a sense the 
main  concern  of  this  generation  was  to  destroy  the  old,  i.e.  traditionality.  The  principle-
guided, inner-directed character was provoked at every turn and with great success. But with 
regard  to  the  new,  i.e.  an  autonomous  life  conduct,  it  was  overwhelmed,  because  in  this 
respect this generation was a generation of beginners and dilettantes who underestimated the  
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intricacies of such a life conduct. Instead of really autonomous answers to the three universal 
mythical questions, i.e. individuated concepts of life, the generation continued to orient itself 
towards collectively binding world views. It typically took refuge in secularist ideologies of 
Marxist  provenance  with  revolutionary,  emancipatory  aims  which  replaced  the  criticised 
religion  and  tradition  as  collective  orientation  and  were  obviously  a  modernist  surrogate 
religion.
12 Religious authorities were substituted with the authority of science, in particular 
sociology.  In fact this was equivalent to a technocratic blurring of the boundary between 
theory and practice and imposed on the social sciences the role of the supplier of a (secular) 
meaning  of  life  which  they  cannot  fulfil.  Autonomous  life  conduct  remained  widely  an 
abstract idea. 
 
(2) The following generation, born approximately between 1952 and 1960, then sought to 
systematically realise the collectivist-ideological program of emancipation the generation of 
‘68  proclaimed  –  whereas  the  generation  of  ‘68  largely  left  disjointed  provocative  and 
symbolic actions without strategy or “master plan”. One aspect of this was a certain sympathy 
with the left-wing terrorists of the 1970s who were admired for their practical consistency and 
their strategic approach in the pursuit of emancipation. 
 
(3) The next generation then turned away from the “top-heavy” ideological orientation of its 
two  predecessor  generations  and  particularly  from  the  strategic  approach  of  a  collective 
revolutionary  action.  It  continued  to  feel  bound  to  the  collectivist  program  of  general 
emancipation, but the strategic means now paradoxically focused on the Individual and his 
“consciousness”.  The  approach  was  to  emancipate  society  through  the  “transformation  of 
consciousness”  and  the  “quest  for  meaning”  that  every  Individual  had  to  perform  by 
him/herself. The slogan “grassroots revolution” is emblematic. With Oevermann I call this 
generation, born between approximately 1960 to 1967, the “crisis of meaning generation”. In 
its  search  for  meaning  it  consequently  was  interested  in  everything  that  promised  “self 
experience” and greater “self awareness”. This generation is the bearer of the esoteric boom 
of the 1980s and 1990s, of the so called psycho wave, of the interest in meditative religions of 
the Far East, of the ecological movement, of New Age and other forms of so-called new 
religious  movements.  Some  colleagues  misinterpreted  these  phenomena  as  a  “return  to 
religiosity”  and  a  refutation  of  the  secularisation  thesis.  In  fact  this  generation  has  only 
discarded  the  ideological  secularism  of  its  two  predecessor  generations  which  was  itself 
religious in its claim for collective validity.
13 In the search for meaning this generation has  
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opened itself up to the whole spectrum of traditions and offers of ultimate meaning, religious 
as well as secular. 
Its reception of these traditions normally was eclectic and based on the premise that not a 
religious authority but the autonomous Individual decides which contents to adopt for his or 
her life conduct. A restriction of this autonomy, however, lies in the fact that these contents 
were  not  created  autonomously,  out  of  the  normal  life  praxis  according  to  the  authentic 
experiences made in this praxis. Rather it continuously adopted these contents from outside 
sources of meaning and from artificial “self experiences” that were sought outside the real life 
praxis where the “self” easily implodes into a blank abstraction. Only the question, which of 
the available, already existing contents will be adopted and combined to a personal patchwork 
myth, was answered autonomously. A consequence of this restricted mode of autonomy was 
that  such  a  probation  myth  and  life  concept  lacks  inner  coherence,  plausibility  and 
authenticity. It was not a product of the individual life praxis in the way the former collective 
religions and myths had consistently grown out of the collective life praxis of a particular 
community over the course of its history.  
In contemporary sociology of religion great difficulties exist in adequately analysing this form 
of  “patchwork  religiosity”  with  its  restricted  mode  of  autonomy.  Often  this  restriction  of 
autonomy is completely ignored as already in Luckmann’s theory of modern religion and its 
“privatisation”. In this over thirty-years-old, but still very influential social-constructionist 
approach the autonomy of the modern Individual is conceptualised as free (consumer) choice 
from a broad palette of ultimate meanings offered by tradition and religious entrepreneurs. 
Little thought is given to the possibility of an  Individual that creates his contents of life 
autonomously  and  consistently  according  to  his  biographical  experiences.  But  strictly 
speaking,  such  an  approach  remains  largely  a  description  or  paraphrase  of  “patchwork 
religiosity” and does not allow for its substantial, instructive analysis. Rather, it results in 
blindness to the analytically important question of inner coherence, plausibility, authenticity 
and  “persuasiveness”  of  the  particular  contents  of  faith,  as  if  these  contents  and  their 
plausibility would be irrelevant or insignificant to the sociological analysis of religion. But 
not only for the religious Individual are these contents and their credibility essential. Also for 
the sociological analysis of religion these contents and their inner structure stand in the very 
centre,  as  Weber  has  demonstrated  in  his  famous  analysis  of  protestant  ethics.  Not  only 
external causes bring about a religious transformation, but also the internal problems of faith 
propels such a transformation and consequently also a transformation of society. In the case  
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of modern “patchwork religiosity” it is primarily the problem of authenticity and the lack of 
coherence which drives a further transformation.  
 
(4) The following generation corresponds to Douglas Coupland’s US-American “Generation 
X”.
14  Born  between  approximately  1967  and  1975,  this  generation  has  given  up  its 
predecessors’  collectivist  program  of  general  emancipation  and  developed  a  culture  of 
downright avoidance of collectivist idealism which appears as a negative-pattern. The name 
“Generation X” that was used for this Generation in the German feuilletons for a certain time 
expresses this effort of  evading identification and particular predicates, so that this effort 
paradoxically became itself a predicate. The Generation typically kept away from idealistic 
objectives with a forced tendency towards irony and the pursuit of its private interests with 
ostentation. It cultivated a lifestyle of being smart, of using marketing techniques to advance 
private interests and of being consumption and “fun” oriented. This negation of collective 
idealism through the accentuated pursuit of private interests undoubtedly meant a further step 
towards an autonomous life conduct, because it paved the way for an autonomous practice of 
making a living, of standing on one’s own feet. But it also included the limitation of the 
autonomous life conduct to self-reproduction. Naturally self-reproduction as such does not 
suffice to furnish life with meaning. The meaning of  a human life is only realised in its 
contribution  to  others,  to  the  community  and  to  humankind.  Thus  the  problem  of 
autonomously giving meaning to life remained unresolved. In face of this, it isn’t surprising 
that this generation in general shied away from responsibility to family, society or politics. 
 
5. The youngest adult generation 
(5) Now to the youngest adult generation, born since 1975.
15 Naturally, we know less about 
this generation.
16  It is almost strikingly inconspicuous and unobtrusive. It is success- and 
achievement-oriented like its predecessor generation. But obviously it interprets success not 
only in terms of the pursuit of private interests, but in terms of “idealistic” criteria as well. 
Because it would seem to engage once more with idealistic, “positive” issues, the expression 
Generation X is no longer appropriate for it. But in contrast to previous idealistic generations, 
that  shared  common  values  and  aims,  the  idealism  of  the  youngest  adult  generation  is 
apparently entirely individual as well as sobered. To all appearances it results concretely from 
biography, from autonomously answering the basic mythical questions “Who am I? Where do 
I come from? Where am I going?” in a consistent manner. Thus individuals in this generation  
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seem to be directed to making their own biography a success. Therefore you could call this 
generation,  as  Oevermann  did,  “biography  entrepreneurs”.  It  seriously  and  pragmatically 
endeavours  to  cope  with  self  responsibility  and  with  the  challenging  problems  of  the 
autonomous life conduct. Correspondingly it tries with modesty to take responsibility in the 
family, in society and in politics. This shows up, for example, in the fact that the boy or girl 
friend is usually regarded as a candidate for marriage right from the start, even if a marriage 
seems  to  lie  far  away  due  to  the  biographical  phase  and  circumstances.  The  predecessor 
generation dallied with pure fun relationships, “one night stands” and with singleness as a 
virtue. In general the youngest adult generation presents itself as interested in politics but 
without  claiming  to  see  through  politics,  as  was  typically  the  case  in  the  predecessor 
generation. It endeavours to prepare solidly for taking over responsibility in a job, whereas the 
predecessor  generation  was  partly  successful  with  marketing  bluffs  instead  of  solid 
achievements. (This played a role in the boom in information technologies during the 1990s.)  
 
6. Conclusions. The succession of generations as a process of secularisation 
I have tried to demonstrate that the process of secularisation in the succession of generations 
in Germany not only becomes apparent in the steady quantitative regression of “religiosity”, 
but can also be traced materially in the transformation of the very form of each generation. 
The consciousness of autonomy (autonomy in the sense of a structure potential of human 
life), the understanding of the difficulties and problems of the autonomous life conduct and 
the  sovereignty  in  coping  with  them  seem  to  grow  from  generation  to  generation.  The 
autonomy-oriented and in this respect very pretentious, ideological and illusory program of 
general  emancipation  and  de-traditionalisation  embraced  by  the  generation  of  ‘68  was 
gradually replaced by realism and modesty. This succession of generations appears as the 
piecemeal  realisation  of  the  constitutive  features  of  an  autonomous  life  conduct,  which 
initially  was  more  an  abstract  program  than  a  concrete  reality.  Some  members  of  older 
generations followed the line of transformation some steps and revised their original concepts 
of life. There are some indications of certain parallels between the generational change of the 
different  modern  industrial  nations,  although  the  formation  of  a  generation  is  bound  to  a 
particular political community. But a detailed knowledge of this phenomenon would be a task 
for future research. In the youngest adult generation the transformation process seems to reach 
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10 At this point a possible objection could refer to the case of George W. Bush’s emphatic rhetoric of “freedom” 
and his interpretation of history as a kind of salvific history which aims at the realisation of autonomy, because 
they are obviously religious in character (as well as national) and therefore could be cited against the assumption 
that it is secularsation which consists in the ever more elaborate articulation of the human autonomy potential. 
But a closer look at this rhetoric and interpretation of history rather confirms this assumption, because it seems 
to be exactly the lack of soberness, realism and down-to-earth orientation (that is a natural consequence of the 
disenchantment  and  realisation  of  the  human  autonomy  potential  and  of  the  largeness  of  the  challenge  an 
autonomous life conduct poses) in his religiously detached worldview that has enabled a foreign policy that has 
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oppressors. In such cases a consistently autonomy-oriented foreign policy would have to accept and respect such 
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peoples that this is, even though perhaps without consciousness, an autonomous decision and that, at least with 
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11  In  a  sense  I  regard  this  article  as  continuation  of  David  Riesman’s  analysis  beyond  the  point  of  the 
transformation process where Riesman’s analysis ended. 
12 Later as established adults many replaced ideological Marxism with an ideological “Neo-Liberalism” or to put 
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14 See Coupland, D. (1991), Rosen, B. C. (2001). 
15 This generation is the first generation whose members experienced their adolescence and developed their 
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of  contemporary  adolescents  in  Germany  with  the  case  reconstructionist  methodology  of  Objective 
Hermeneutics. I belong to this project and will participate in this research process. 
17 This  motivates the speculation that it  will be this  generation that  will accomplish the introduction of an 
unconditional basic income when it dominates the political scene. 